Printable Version
The Role of Japan in Securing Stability in Asia
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
The Center for
National Policy continued it’s Asia Security
Program by hosting Michael Green, former senior
director for Asian affairs at the National
Security Council from January 2004 to December
2005 and Michael Schiffer, program officer
responsible for Asia programs at the Stanley
Foundation. The topic of the lunch time event
was Japan’s role in security stability in Asia
and focused on the U.S.- Japan
relationship.
Both speakers began by reinforcing how important the U.S.- Japan strategic partnership is, with Schiffer arguing that “looking forward, it’s impossible to conceive […] how you can have a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia that does not include a positively engaged Japan and a strong and enduring U.S.-Japan alliance.”
Both speakers agreed that the U.S.-Japan relationship is in a relatively good place and enjoys strong bipartisan support. Additionally, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has the benefit of strong structural underpinnings including the “sense of common values, the sense of common purpose in the face of challenges ranging from climate change to North Korea’s nuclear weapons, to China’s rise [...]” according to Green. Both speakers then presented their lists of tangible strategic benefits the alliance with Japan provides, including:
The second is an issue of demographics. With Japan’s rapidly aging population, effective immigration policies and the empowerment of women is required to stem the severe labor shortages that plague Japan’s vast economy. Unfortunately this issue has not been adequately addressed to date. The third deals with economic reform that is hamstrung by the political problems. Without economic reform Japan risks being left behind in the process of building regional trade agreements and architecture.
The final problem is that Japanese Self-Defense Forces do not have as big a role in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions as they should. Green feels Japanese Self-Defense Forces are willing to take on a greater leadership role in missions that are consistent with Japan’s pacifist constitution, but this too requires political leadership that is currently lacking.
On the American side, the first challenge is the Iraq War. For some time in the future, Iraq will sap the attention of senior leadership in the U.S. Serious effort is required to balance Iraq with other important commitments and regions. Additionally, according to Green, “precipitous withdrawal from Iraq will send shockwaves across Asia, both in terms of stability in the Middle East and energy and sea lane security, but also because of what it says about American commitment when friends and allies are in dangerous situations, which frankly, Japan is.”
The second challenge deals with ongoing negotiations with North Korea. The Japanese are worried that the U.S. will ignore their concerns (mainly the abductee issue) in an effort to reach agreement with Pyongyang. This again, goes to our credibility as an ally.
Finally, basing will continue to be a problem. If we are unable to move ahead with Japan on the plan to relocate half of the Marines on Okinawa to Guam we will continue to have “a ticking time bomb in Okinawa with very crowded areas around runways and an accident waiting to happen.”
Schiffer also worries that a degree of strategic drift has plagued the relationship the last few years that, left unaddressed, could threaten the partnership. On balance though, both speakers were confident the alliance will endure and prosper. Green pointed to the lack of significant opposition to the Alliance on both sides of the Pacific as a positive sign. Schiffer ended his presentation by suggesting “so long as Japan is able to continue to play the sort of security, diplomatic, economic, and political role that is commensurate with its capabilities, we have every opportunity and every likelihood that we’ll continue to see a peaceful and prosperous Asia moving forward.” He then suggested that the next phase of growth for the Alliance would be to embed the Alliance more firmly in the region’s emerging architecture in a way that way that leverages the Alliance, rather than dilutes it.
Both speakers began by reinforcing how important the U.S.- Japan strategic partnership is, with Schiffer arguing that “looking forward, it’s impossible to conceive […] how you can have a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia that does not include a positively engaged Japan and a strong and enduring U.S.-Japan alliance.”
Both speakers agreed that the U.S.-Japan relationship is in a relatively good place and enjoys strong bipartisan support. Additionally, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has the benefit of strong structural underpinnings including the “sense of common values, the sense of common purpose in the face of challenges ranging from climate change to North Korea’s nuclear weapons, to China’s rise [...]” according to Green. Both speakers then presented their lists of tangible strategic benefits the alliance with Japan provides, including:
- The ability to project power in East and West Asia from U.S. bases in Japanese territory.
- The presence of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces complicates Chinese planning. This adds a measure of stability in the region and dissuades those that might consider using force.
- Japanese soft power. Japan, as the second largest contributor to most of the major international financial institutions, including The World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank and the UN, has considerable standing abroad. Additionally, Japan has a key role to play in demonstrating the importance of our shared values of democracy, of open regionalism, etc. This has had an effect on democratization across Asia over the years.
The second is an issue of demographics. With Japan’s rapidly aging population, effective immigration policies and the empowerment of women is required to stem the severe labor shortages that plague Japan’s vast economy. Unfortunately this issue has not been adequately addressed to date. The third deals with economic reform that is hamstrung by the political problems. Without economic reform Japan risks being left behind in the process of building regional trade agreements and architecture.
The final problem is that Japanese Self-Defense Forces do not have as big a role in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions as they should. Green feels Japanese Self-Defense Forces are willing to take on a greater leadership role in missions that are consistent with Japan’s pacifist constitution, but this too requires political leadership that is currently lacking.
On the American side, the first challenge is the Iraq War. For some time in the future, Iraq will sap the attention of senior leadership in the U.S. Serious effort is required to balance Iraq with other important commitments and regions. Additionally, according to Green, “precipitous withdrawal from Iraq will send shockwaves across Asia, both in terms of stability in the Middle East and energy and sea lane security, but also because of what it says about American commitment when friends and allies are in dangerous situations, which frankly, Japan is.”
The second challenge deals with ongoing negotiations with North Korea. The Japanese are worried that the U.S. will ignore their concerns (mainly the abductee issue) in an effort to reach agreement with Pyongyang. This again, goes to our credibility as an ally.
Finally, basing will continue to be a problem. If we are unable to move ahead with Japan on the plan to relocate half of the Marines on Okinawa to Guam we will continue to have “a ticking time bomb in Okinawa with very crowded areas around runways and an accident waiting to happen.”
Schiffer also worries that a degree of strategic drift has plagued the relationship the last few years that, left unaddressed, could threaten the partnership. On balance though, both speakers were confident the alliance will endure and prosper. Green pointed to the lack of significant opposition to the Alliance on both sides of the Pacific as a positive sign. Schiffer ended his presentation by suggesting “so long as Japan is able to continue to play the sort of security, diplomatic, economic, and political role that is commensurate with its capabilities, we have every opportunity and every likelihood that we’ll continue to see a peaceful and prosperous Asia moving forward.” He then suggested that the next phase of growth for the Alliance would be to embed the Alliance more firmly in the region’s emerging architecture in a way that way that leverages the Alliance, rather than dilutes it.