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Jun 25, 2012
Posted by Gregory Aftandilian
The announcement on June 24 that Muslim
Brotherhood presidential candidate Mohammed
Morsi defeated former Mubarak prime minister,
Ahmed Shafik, was most likely a way for Egypt's
SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) to
mollify the Islamist camp to preclude domestic
unrest without giving up much power.
Rumors abounded in Cairo that the Brotherhood
had been in negotiations with the SCAF ahead of
the announcement, and given the Brotherhood's
penchant to participate in such talks, a back
room deal is likely to have occurred. For
the time being, both sides are content with
what they achieved.
For the Brotherhood,
the announcement of a Morsi win was a true
milestone. Having been largely persecuted
(first by the monarchy, then by the
republican-nationalist regime) for most of its
existence since 1928, the Brotherhood finally
achieved official legitimacy by winning an
election to the coveted position of president.
The enthusiastic celebration by Brotherhood
members and supporters in Tahrir Square was a
genuine reflection of this pent-up feeling that
they had finally made it to the presidency.
Morsi did his best to quell fears that he would
embark on a narrow path by claiming he would
work for the benefit of all Egyptians,
regardless of religion, and would abide by
international treaties. As the titular
head of state (although not yet sworn into
office), he was then in position to receive
congratulatory phone calls, including one from
President Obama.
The SCAF undoubtedly
would have liked Shafik, a former Air Force
Commander, to have won the presidency, but
pressuring the Supreme Presidential Electoral
Commission to announce a Shafik win would have
backfired, especially after the initial
counting showed that Morsi was in the lead.
Shortly before the polls closed, the SCAF,
sensing a likely Morsi victory, however, issued
a number of decrees that greatly reduced the
powers of the presidency. These included: no
control over the military and the military's
budget; no power to declare war without the
military's consent; the military's veto power
over provisions in the yet-to-be-written new
constitution; and the military's power to craft
legislation in the absence of a
parliament. Shortly before the
presidential election, the military moved
quickly to seal off parliament after Egypt's
high court ruled that the parliamentary
elections had been illegal. Anger over these
measures, especially by the Brotherhood which
lost its leadership position in parliament,
would have likely boiled over into street
violence if, on top of all of this, Shafik was
declared the winner over Morsi. Hence,
the SCAF, using the delay in election's
announcement to negotiate with the Brotherhood,
probably laid down some markers: we'll
give you the presidency provided that you do
not engage in street violence, you make
reassuring remarks about international
treaties, and you do not try to pursue a strict
Islamist agenda.
Morsi thus comes to the
presidency with very little power. There was
even a remark from a SCAF adviser last week to
the effect that once the new constitution is
written within three months, there might be new
elections to the presidency. Although the
military might eventually return to the
barracks, it is indicating that it will only do
so after it completes a process that it will
tightly control.
Now that Egypt has a
Muslim Brotherhood president, the SCAF will
likely ensure that the new parliament, when it
is elected, will not be led by the
Brotherhood. In this way, the SCAF will
try to balance an Islamist presidency with a
secular-dominated or an evenly-split
parliament. Although the first
post-Mubarak parliamentary elections resulted
in the Brotherhood taking 47 percent of the
seats in the People's Assembly, there is a good
chance it will not achieve that victory
again. Many of the votes for the
Brotherhood in the late 2011 period were from
non-Brotherhood Egyptians willing to give the
Brotherhood a try, and they did not like the
Brotherhood's performance once it actually ran
parliament. The Brotherhood can probably
count on about 25 percent of the electorate
(about the percentage that Morsi received in
the first round of the presidential elections)
but it will be a real challenge to get much
more. Secular forces will probably do
better than before in new parliamentary
elections--partly in reaction to Morsi winning
the presidency--and the fundamentalist Salafis
might do about the same. This will mean
that parliament might have a slight secular
majority or be so evenly split it will not be
an effective body.
The SCAF probably
hopes this type of divide and rule strategy
will work toward their ultimate goal--keeping
the civilian politicians away from ruling over
the military and scrutinizing the military's
budget. The Brotherhood is probably
hoping that if Morsi becomes a popular
president it will translate into eventual
parliamentary wins. But whatever comes to
pass later, for the time being there seems to
be a truce of sorts between the military and
the Brotherhood.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Center for National Policy.
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