Al-Qaida's budget slips through cracks
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By ROBERT WINDREM and GARRETT HAAKE, NBC
Seven years after
the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. intelligence
officials believe they've won many small
victories against al-Qaida's ability to finance
its operations, but they remain unable to put a
concrete dollar figure on their
impact.
That's because they have no
reliable estimate of al-Qaida's overall budget,
according to current and former U.S.
counterterrorism officials, which means the
only measures of the organization's economic
health are sporadic, anecdotal and
fragmentary.
"When you see a cell
complaining that it hasn't received its monthly
or biannual stipend and it's unable to pay the
salaries of the people in the cell, unable to
make the support payments to the families of
terrorists living or dead, that's a tremendous
indicator we have pressured the financial
channel," said Adam Szubin, the director of the
U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control and the man in charge of tracking
terrorist finance.
Intelligence agencies
scan phone conversations, e-mails, fax
transmissions and instant message traffic for
hints they have thwarted the flow of money to
al-Qaida and other jihadist groups. But they
are unable to get a firmer grasp on the overall
state of terrorist finances, in part, because
of the nature of most
operations.
"Terrorism is unfortunately
not a rich man's sport," said a former OFAC
official, meaning that it does not take a lot
of money to carry out a major attack. Tracking
those small numbers in the vast sea of global
financial transactions is
difficult.
Cost differentials
An NBC
News analysis of attacks by al-Qaida and other
Sunni extremist groups shows that only one cost
as much as $500,000 — the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks on the United States. But others, like
the 2005 attack on the London transit system or
the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, cost
less than $15,000 to carry out.
At the
bottom end of the scale, the simplest
first-generation suicide bombs constructed by
the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas,
consisting of duffle bags filled with black
powder from unexploded Israeli land mines and
ignition switches from abandoned cars, cost no
more than $200.
The money also is
difficult to track because terrorists do not
use the world financial system as extensively
as they once did, due partly to U.S. success in
cracking down on it.
"Part of it is that
the U.S. is sitting on the international
banking system," said Roger Cressey, deputy
counter terrorism chief in the Clinton and Bush
administrations and now an NBC News analyst.
The United States has sponsored a U.N.
terrorism funding blacklist, which requires all
member states to freeze the assets and impose
an international travel ban on people and
entities placed on the list.
No one
wants to be placed on the U.N. list of 503
people and entities or OFAC's 404-page list of
"Specially Designated Nationals," a voluminous
compilation of everyone from Cuban tourist
agents to Osama bin Laden. Officials said they
have intelligence — gathered from electronic
eavesdropping — of prospective donors
expressing concern about giving money to a
charity or other entity that's been
listed.
"You'll hear them say 'I'm not
giving money anymore to X, they've been
listed'," said one official.
Lately,
cracks have developed in the list, as legal
challenges mount and political support drops,
especially in Europe. But Szubin believes the
splits are overblown and that European allies
will succeed in maintaining the
system.
Figure 'totally made
up'
Despite the anecdotal successes Szubin
cites, U.S. estimates of al-Qaida's budget are
rife with problems, according to Richard
Clarke, former boss of the White House
counterterrorism office.
In 2003, the
United States estimated that al-Qaida's budget
before the Sept. 11 attacks was $35 million and
that it fell to $5 million just two years after
the attacks. Those numbers were repeated in the
final report of the 9/11
Commission.
"That number was totally
made up, totally made up," Clarke said of the
$35 million figure.
Clarke explained the
figure was based on limited real information.
"I don't think there is an integrated budget.
In U.S. business parlance, there are 'cost
centers', but not an integrated budget," he
said.
Even the most cited official
measure, OFAC's annual tally of blocked
al-Qaida assets, is by Szubin's own admission
irrelevant to understanding the state of
terrorist financing and the success of U.S.
efforts.
OFAC's most recent report,
issued in early October, lists $11.324 million
in blocked al-Qaida assets, predominantly
financial instruments. That number is up from
$7.7 million the year before, mainly due to an
increase in the number of people and
organizations designated by Treasury as
terrorists.
"Some have mistakenly drawn
on figures of blocked assets as we summarized
in our report," Szubin said. "There is a hunger
for data and these are numbers, but we try to
put a major caveat there and say we don't view
these numbers as an indicator of the pressure
we're putting on terrorist
groups."
Clarke said the best indicator,
beyond real-time intelligence gathering, is
often the data found in laptops, documents,
notebooks and calendars taken after a
successful raid or arrest.
"When they do
get a cell, you can grab financial documents
and do an analysis, go back and find out how
they moved their money and then move in on
them," Clarke said.
That way, he said,
you get a sense of what means they are using to
move money and then can try to stanch the flow
in the future. But because of al-Qaida's
compartmentalization, it doesn't provide a good
picture of the organization's financial
health.
Turn to crime for funding
One
thing analysts are sure about is that al-Qaida
and other terrorism organizations are
continuing to get money from somewhere, even if
many of the international channels have been
closed. Officials believe one of the biggest
sources of money is simply "self funding,"
making money off legitimate businesses or
crime.
"One pattern we've seen in
southern Europe is counterfeiting, not of
currency, but goods, travel documents, a skill
you would expect a jihadi cell to have," Szubin
said.
U.S. intelligence also has seen
jihadis engaged in carjackings and theft. In
North Africa, they are making a lot of money
off the drug trade, not as primary suppliers or
movers, but extorting suppliers or moves. "They
will take a cut," Szubin said.
Some
major drug dealers may have been helping as
well.
Among those on the U.S. list is
Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian underworld figure
believed responsible for the 1993 terrorist
attacks in Bombay that killed more than 250
people suspected of running one of south Asia's
most effective heroin smuggling rings. Now,
al-Qaida is using the same routes to smuggle
cash, the Treasury said.
"Ibrahim's
syndicate is involved in large-scale shipments
of narcotics in the U.K. and Western Europe,"
according to a Treasury Department intelligence
report.
"The syndicate's smuggling
routes from South Asia, the Middle East and
Africa are shared with bin Laden and his
terrorist network. Successful routes
established over recent years by Ibrahim's
syndicate have been subsequently utilized by
bin Laden. A financial arrangement was
reportedly brokered to facilitate the latter's
usage of these routes," the report
stated.
Al-Qaida also has taken to using
one of the most basic means of moving money:
carrying it around in suitcases, briefcases and
bags using trusted couriers.
While the
United States claims to be making an effort to
thwart cash couriers, Clarke said there is a
cultural problem.
"In the Middle East,
people do carry millions around in briefcases,"
he said. "It doesn't mean they're terrorists.
It's just part of their culture,
tradition."
'Fooling
ourselves'
Michael Sheehan, former director
of counterterrorism at the New York Police
Department, believes that while there is a
continuing need to push down hard on terrorism
financiers, a lack of money is not going to
deter attacks.
"You have to do it, you
can't leave it unfettered, but it's never going
to be determinative factor," said Sheehan, now
an NBC analyst.
"Terrorists are always
bitching about money. For two years before the
1998 embassy attacks, they bitched about money.
Terrorists bitch about money the way soldiers
bitch about the chow, but that doesn't mean the
soldiers aren't going to fight or the
terrorists aren't going to attack," Sheehan
said.
More important and more difficult
to shut down, according to Sheehan, is the
funding by Saudi and other Gulf States of
Islamic schools (the madrassas) and “charities”
in Pakistan, “which may not be directly
involved in terrorism but stir it all
up.”
Former Congressman Tim Roemer
(D-Ind.), a member of the 9/11 Commission and
someone likely to have an intelligence role in
the incoming Obama administration, agreed with
Sheehan.
"We are only fooling ourselves
if we think that financial action alone, or any
other counterterrorism tool used in isolation,
is sufficient to cripple al-Qaida," Roemer
said.
"Terrorist groups sustain
themselves not only through force of arms, but
by rooting themselves in a variety of social
and political factors in their host societies.
Disrupting their cash flow is simply one tool
among many other political, diplomatic and
military tools that must be applied in
combination to successfully destroy al-Qaida,"
Roemer said.
Robert Windrem is an NBC
News Investigative Producer; Garrett Haake is
an NBC News researcher.


